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APPOINTMENTS, INNOVATION, AND THE
JUDICIAL–POLITICAL DIVIDE
GILLIAN E. METZGER†
ABSTRACT
The federal appointments process is having its proverbial day in
the sun. The appointment and removal of federal officers figured
centrally in the Supreme Court’s two major recent separation-ofpowers decisions, Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board and National Labor Relations Board v.
Noel Canning. The appointments process has featured even more
prominently in the political sphere, figuring in a number of
congressional–presidential confrontations. Such simultaneous top
billing in the judicial and political spheres is hardly coincidental.
After all, it was President Obama’s use of the Recess Appointments
Clause in response to pro forma sessions that triggered the Court’s
engagement with the Clause in Noel Canning. But the relationship
between the Clause’s judicial and political manifestations is more
complicated, and more fraught, than mere practical causality. The
Roberts Court’s approach to appointments and separation of powers
issues stands out for its Burkean resistance to innovation. By contrast,
the dominant characteristic of appointments in the political sphere is
novelty and embrace of new institutional arrangements.
This Article explores these differing judicial and political
approaches to innovation, and the implications of the emerging
contrast for federal administration. Although the Court’s resistance to
innovation might appear a useful prophylactic against efforts to bend
the Constitution in the name of political expediency, the constitutional
basis for such a general suspicion of innovation is lacking.
Particularly given the political transformations occurring in response
to polarization, a stance of suspicion sets the Court on a course of
confrontation with the other two branches that is hard to justify. A
more nuanced approach that pays greater attention to political reality
would allow the Court to both better titrate its interventions to
constitutional structure and minimize the disruptive effects of its
decisions.

Copyright © 2015 Gillian E. Metzger.
† Stanley H. Fuld Professor of Law, Columbia Law School.

METZGER IN PRINTER FINAL (COMPLETED) (DO NOT DELETE)

1608

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

5/7/2015 6:34 PM

[Vol. 64:1607

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction ........................................................................................... 1608
I. Appointments in the Courts ............................................................ 1611
A. The Roberts Court and the Appointments Process:
Free Enterprise Fund and Noel Canning Compared ....... 1612
B. Against Institutional Innovation ....................................... 1619
II. Appointments in the Political Branches ....................................... 1623
A. Contemporary Politics and the Separation of Powers .... 1624
1. Appointments ................................................................... 1624
2. Broader Separation-of-Powers Trends: Defaults,
Shutdowns, and Executive Unilateralism .................... 1627
B. Innovation and Political Polarization ............................... 1630
1. Political Polarization, Divided Government, and
Innovation ...................................................................... 1630
2. Political Polarization, United Government, and
Regulatory Innovation................................................... 1633
III. Assessing the Judicial–Political Divide ....................................... 1636
Conclusion .............................................................................................. 1643
INTRODUCTION
The federal appointments process is having its proverbial day in
the sun. The appointment and removal of federal officers figured
centrally in the Supreme Court’s two major recent separation-ofpowers decisions, Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company
1
Accounting Oversight Board and National Labor Relations Board v.
2
Noel Canning. To be sure, appointment and removal have long
played a major role in judicial analysis of the scope of presidential
3
power. But for over two decades these issues had lain largely

1. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477 (2010).
2. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014). A third contender
for this status was Department of Transportation v. Association of American Railroads, 135 S.Ct.
1225 (2015), which involved separation-of-powers and due-process challenges to the Passenger
Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008. The D.C. Circuit had held that the Act
represented an unconstitutional delegation of standard-setting authority to a private entity,
Amtrak, but the Supreme Court reversed, reaffirming its earlier decision in Lebron v. National
Railroad Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374 (1995), that Amtrak is a governmental actor for
constitutional purposes. Assoc. of Am. R.R.s, 135 S. Ct. at 1228. In so doing, the Court
remanded for the D.C. Circuit to consider “substantial questions . . . implicating the
Constitution’s structural separation of powers and the Appointments Clause,” id., and thus the
case may return to the Court in the future.
3. See, e.g., Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 106–07, 161, 173–74 (1926).
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judicially dormant, which alone makes their recent star turn notable.
Moreover, the net result is that the Roberts Court has used
appointments, and more broadly the issue of control over federal
officers, as the frame for articulating its separation-of-powers vision.
The appointments process has featured even more prominently
in the political sphere, figuring in a number of congressional–
presidential confrontations. Again, the use of appointments as an
4
occasion for political contestation has a long historical pedigree. But
appointments have become the brave new world of American politics.
Senators have used their confirmation role to resist presidential
initiatives in new ways, such as delaying key executive-branch
appointments and holding pro forma sessions to prevent recess
5
appointments. The President has responded in kind, wielding the
recess-appointments power assertively and experimenting with White
6
House policy czars and other executive-branch positions. Moreover,
these growing political confrontations over appointments have
provoked a major change to the appointments process, with the
Senate changing rules to free executive-branch and judicial
7
appointments from the filibuster.
Such simultaneous top billing in the judicial and political spheres
is hardly coincidental. After all, it was President Obama’s use of the
Recess Appointments Clause in response to pro forma sessions that
triggered the Court’s engagement with the Clause in Noel Canning.
But the relationship between the Clause’s judicial and political
manifestations is more complicated, and more fraught, than mere
practical causality. The Roberts Court’s approach to appointments
and separation-of-powers issues stands out for its Burkean resistance
4. See generally MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS: A
CONSTITUTIONAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS (Duke Univ. Press rev. ed. 2003) (providing a
comprehensive analysis of the presidential–senatorial conflicts over executive appointments
since the Early Republic).
5. See infra Part II.A.
6. See generally Aaron J. Saiger, Obama’s “Czars” for Domestic Policy and the Law of the
White House Staff, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2577 (2011) (describing the emergence of White
House policy czars in the Obama administration); Lawfulness of Recess Appointments during a
Recess of the Senate Notwithstanding Periodic Pro Forma Sessions, 36 Op. O.L.C., 2012 WL
168645 (2012) (presidential use of recess appointments during pro forma Senate sessions);
Whether the Special Master for Troubled Asset Relief Program Executive Compensation Is a
Principal Officer under the Appointments Clause, 34 Op. O.L.C., 2010 WL 4963118 (2010)
(assessing the constitutionality of the appointments process for the TARP “pay czar,” who is
charged with reviewing executive compensation at companies receiving TARP funds).
7. See Jeremy W. Peters, In Landmark Vote, Senate Limits the Use of the Filibuster, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 21, 2013, at A1.
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to innovation. New institutional arrangements or assertions of power
at the federal level are presumed constitutionally suspect; structural
experimentation is a cause for concern rather than celebration. By
contrast, the dominant characteristic of appointments in the political
sphere is novelty and innovation. This characteristic holds true of
national politics and legislation writ large. Established norms and
conventions that governed Congress have fallen by the wayside,
replaced by new arenas of political contestation and dispute.
Innovation is even clearer in the executive branch, with the President
responding to congressional inaction and resistance with new
administrative measures. Innovation has been a significant feature of
recent periods of united government as well, with the dominant party
taking advantage of rare alignment of the branches to pass significant
legislative measures.
This contrast between judicial conservatism and political
innovation is striking. Whether the Court is responding to the
political climate or acting independently is hard to know. But these
contrasting approaches suggest that disagreement between the Court
and the political branches on matters of governmental structure is
likely to continue. That the Court’s decisions fail to engage with
current political realities is as troubling. The signal characteristic of
national politics today is increasing political polarization, what some
9
call hyperpolarization. Political polarization has a close relationship
to political innovation. Not only has deepening polarization instigated
many novel congressional and executive measures, but efforts to
mitigate polarization in Congress are also likely to entail further
structural changes. Yet recognition of the current polarized political
environment is notably absent from the Court’s separation-of-powers
analysis.
The Court’s resistance to innovation might appear a useful
prophylactic against efforts to bend the Constitution in the name of
political expediency. But such a general suspicion of innovation lacks
a constitutional basis. Particularly given the political transformations
occurring in response to polarization, a stance of suspicion sets the
Court on a course of confrontation with the other two branches that is

8. For discussions of the Burkean approach to constitutional interpretation, see Thomas
W. Merrill, Bork v. Burke, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 509, 509–15 (1996); Cass R. Sunstein,
Constitutional Personae, 2013 SUP. CT. REV. 433, 443–45, 454–55.
9. See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes, Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of
Hyperpolarized Democracy in America, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 273, 276–81 (2011).
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hard to justify. A more nuanced approach that pays greater attention
to political reality would allow the Court to both better titrate its
interventions to constitutional structure and minimize its decisions’
disruptive effects.
Part I examines the Court’s recent appointments decisions,
identifying resistance to innovation as a theme running throughout
the Roberts Court’s structural jurisprudence. Part II turns to the
political sphere, examining polarization trends and the relationship
between polarization and political innovation. Part III then assesses
the relationship between these judicial and political trends, analyzing
their likely combined effect and potential normative implications.
I. APPOINTMENTS IN THE COURTS
The federal appointments process is no stranger to constitutional
litigation. Historically, the Appointments Clause surfaced only
occasionally and then primarily with respect to the question of who
counted as a government officer, reflecting the nation’s heavy
reliance on private individuals working on a fee basis to carry out the
10
work of government. Over the twentieth century, the Clause made a
more regular appearance. A few cases traced the line between
11
principal and inferior officers, while others addressed the limits of
12
Congress’s role in appointments. But most prominent judicial
discussions of the constitutional scheme governing officers have long
focused more on removal from office rather than appointment to it.
Although much scholarly ink has been spilled debating the scope of
the President’s removal power, the Court upheld for-cause removal
protections in the early New Deal and adhered to that position fifty
13
years later in its next serious engagement with the issue.

10. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; see also, e.g., Auffmordt v. Hedden, 137 U.S. 310, 319,
326–27 (1890) (addressing whether a merchant appraiser, whose fee was imposed on the
plaintiff importer, was an officer); United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 510, 511–12 (1878)
(addressing whether a surgeon examining pensioners on request for a fee was an officer). See
generally NICHOLAS PARRILLO, AGAINST THE PROFIT MOTIVE (2014) (analyzing the evolution
of the constitutional norm against profiteering by government officials).
11. See, e.g., Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 661–65 (1997); Morrison v. Olson, 487
U.S. 654, 671 (1988).
12. See, e.g., Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise,
Inc., 501 U.S. 252, 289–90 (1991); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 141 (1976).
13. See, e.g., Morrison, 487 U.S. at 691–92; Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602,
627–29 (1935); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 132–33, 163–64 (1926).
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The Roberts Court’s decisions in Free Enterprise Fund and Noel
Canning thus served to move the President’s power to appoint and
remove government officers back into the constitutional limelight.
More than this, both decisions showcase the Roberts Court’s
approach to separation of powers writ large. The two opinions are a
striking pair, linked by more similarities than immediately meets the
eye. Perhaps their most dominant shared theme is a Burkean
resistance to innovation.
A. The Roberts Court and the Appointments Process: Free
Enterprise Fund and Noel Canning Compared
Free Enterprise Fund fits neatly within the vein of decisions
assessing presidential control over officers solely through a removal
lens. There, the Roberts Court addressed a challenge to the
constitutionality of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
(PCAOB), which exercises regulatory, enforcement, and disciplinary
authority over the accounting industry. Created by the Sarbanes–
Oxley Act and statutorily denominated a nonprofit corporation, the
PCAOB initially was composed of five members appointed by the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and strongly protected
14
from removal except for good cause. By a vote of five to four, the
Court held that this arrangement violated the Constitution’s vesting
of the executive power in the President and the Take Care Clause
because the members of the SEC were themselves protected from
15
removal except by cause.
According to Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion, the
PCAOB’s double for-cause protection crossed the constitutional line
because it eviscerated the President’s control over the Board and
thereby impaired his ability to ensure that the laws be faithfully
16
executed. On this view, the ability to remove officers is the linchpin
for accountability in government, and no other system of oversight—
not the ability to determine an agency’s budget, approve its rules, or
review its determinations and decisions—matters in constitutional
17
separation-of-powers analysis.
Indeed, the majority even
downplayed the significance of presidential appointment, concluding
that once the PCAOB members’ for-cause protection was severed
14.
15.
16.
17.

Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 483–88 (2010).
Id. at 483, 494–99.
Id. at 495–99.
Id. at 497–506.
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from the statute and they were rendered removable at will by the
SEC, they became inferior officers whose selection did not need to be
18
vested in the President.
The Court’s 2014 decision in Noel Canning is a more unusual
beast, not only addressing the separation-of-powers implications of
appointment directly but doing so in the course of an exegesis of the
Recess Appointments Clause, rarely the subject of sustained judicial
19
attention.
The narrow issue in Noel Canning was the
constitutionality of President Obama’s use of the recess-appointments
20
power when the Senate was in a pro forma session. But, responding
to the D.C. Circuit’s decision below, the Court ruled more broadly,
holding (again five to four) that the Clause could be used during
intrasession as well as intersession recesses and with respect to
vacancies that preexisted a recess as well as those that came into
21
existence once the recess was underway. The Court then proceeded
to rule that President Obama’s recess appointments nonetheless were
unconstitutional because a pro forma session counts as a session if the
Senate says so, provided that it retains the ability to do Senate
22
business. As a result, only a three-day recess existed when the
President made his appointments, and that was too short to trigger
23
the Recess Appointments Clause.
Far more important than these specific holdings, however, are
what the decisions signal about separation-of-powers analysis under
the Roberts Court. Free Enterprise Fund and Noel Canning appear at
the outset to be analytic opposites, decided by reversed 5–4 lineups
and contrasting methodologies, with the difference in majorities
chalked up to Justice Kennedy’s changing allegiances. Separation-ofpowers opinions are often distinguished by whether they reflect a
formalistic emphasis on literal constitutional text and distinct
branches and categories of power or a functionalist attention to actual
24
power relationships, underlying balance, flexibility, and efficacy. On

18. Id. at 509–11.
19. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2560 (2014) (noting that the
Court was “interpret[ing] the Clause . . . for the first time in more than 200 years”).
20. Id. at 2557.
21. Id. at 2556–67, 2561, 2573.
22. Id. at 2574–77.
23. Id. at 2557.
24. For discussion of the difference between formalist and functionalist approaches to the
separation of powers, see generally M. Elizabeth Magill, The Real Separation in Separation of
Powers Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1127, 1136–47 (2000); Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional
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this score, as Professor Ronald Krotoszynski has argued, Free
Enterprise Fund appears to offer a formalistic take on the separation
25
of powers. It viewed the Vesting and Take Care Clauses as
mandating a clear line of removal authority from the President down
and dismissed the many administrative mechanisms through which
the SEC in fact exercised broad control as irrelevant, insisting that
“[t]he Framers did not rest our liberties on such bureaucratic
26
27
minutiae.” A similar formalist cast is evident in Stern v. Marshall, in
which the Court drew a sharp line between adjudication of private
and public rights and identified the former as the constitutionally
28
protected terrain of Article III courts.
In Noel Canning, by contrast, functionalism reigned triumphant.
Now writing for the majority, Justice Breyer repeatedly concluded
that the relevant constitutional text was ambiguous and put prime
29
emphasis instead on achieving its underlying purposes. That
purpose, in the majority’s eyes, was to “ensure the continued
30
functioning of the Government while the Senate is away.” This
functionalist bent was reinforced by the majority’s express reliance on
the historical practice as an important interpretive guide, cautioning
that the Court “must hesitate to upset the compromises and working
arrangements that the elected branches of Government themselves
31
have reached.” Here the formalist analysis was relegated to Justice
Scalia’s opinion concurring in the judgment, which insisted that the
relevant text was clear and rejected reliance on political practice in
32
resolving separation-of-powers disputes.

Approaches to Separation of Powers Questions—A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV.
488 (1987).
25. Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Cooperative Federalism, The New Formalism, and the
Separation of Powers Revisited: Free Enterprise Fund and the Problem of Presidential Oversight
of State-Government Officers Enforcing Federal Law, 61 DUKE L.J. 1599, 1605–07, 1615–18
(2012).
26. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 500 (2010).
27. Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011).
28. Id. at 2608–09 (2011); see also id. at 2619 (“It goes without saying that ‘the fact that a
given law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of
government, standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary to the Constitution.’” (quoting INS
v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983))); Krotoszynski, supra note 25, at 1619–20.
29. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2564, 2567–69 (2014).
30. Id. at 2553.
31. Id. at 2560.
32. Id. at 2592 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Combined with the consistent and even split among the other
Justices, this shift in methodological approach suggests that the
Roberts Court is deeply divided on separation-of-powers matters. But
more analytic similarity exists across these decisions than first
appears. Despite its overall formalistic stance, the Free Enterprise
Fund majority also heavily emphasized more functionalist concerns
33
with political accountability and the dangers of political diffusion. It
was careful to avoid disrupting existing governance relationships,
expressly distinguishing other potential examples of double for-cause
34
arrangements. Moreover, the Court’s remedial approach—simply
excising the for-cause protection enjoyed by the PCAOB—both
served to preserve the Sarbanes–Oxley regulatory scheme and
signaled that the Court was unlikely to call into question established
independent-agency structures with only one level of for-cause
35
protection. Meanwhile, the Noel Canning Court unanimously held
that a pro forma session is not a recess, despite the fact that the
Senate’s use of pro forma sessions to preempt the recessappointments power would appear equally at odds with the Recess
Appointments Clause’s concern to ensure that “the President . . .
obtain the assistance of subordinate officers when the Senate, due to
36
its recess, cannot confirm them.” Further, the majority justified its
33. See John F. Manning, The Supreme Court, 2013 Term—Foreword: The Means of
Constitutional Power, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1, 43–48 (2014) (“[T]he Court in Free Enterprise Fund
ultimately relied on fairly high-level functional considerations to draw the constitutional line at
issue.”); see also Krotoszynski, supra note 25, at 1617–18 (noting how practical concerns with
political accountability surface in the majority opinion, despite its formalist tone and
orientation).
34. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 506–07 (2010).
35. For a contrary view, see generally Neomi Rao, Removal: Necessary and Sufficient for
Presidential Control, 65 ALA. L. REV. 1205 (2014). A similar concern with not disrupting
established administrative relationships is evident in Stern, with the Court there again carving
out administrative agencies from the decision’s scope by ipse dixit. See Stern v. Marshall, 131 S.
Ct. 2594, 2612 n.6, 2615, 2619 (2011). But see New Process Steel, L.P. v. Nat’l Labor Relations
Bd., 560 U.S. 674, 678, 679–83, 688 (2010) (holding that the National Labor Relations Board’s
(NLRB’s) effort to delegate decisionmaking power to just two board members to address the
lack of additional board members was invalid under the National Labor Relations Act, thereby
nullifying nearly 600 NLRB decisions).
36. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2568; see Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Transcending
Formalism and Functionalism in Separation-of-Powers Analysis: Reframing the Appointments
Power After Noel Canning, 64 DUKE L.J. 1513, 1533–42 (2015) (emphasizing Noel Canning’s
mixed formalist and functionalist character). Although minority political opposition was the
barrier to confirmation of the NLRB nominees, what enabled that opposition to continue
without the Senate majority forcing the issue so as to be able to recess was the option of pro
forma sessions. See Lawfulness of Recess Appointments During a Recess of the Senate
Notwithstanding Periodic Pro Forma Sessions, 36 Op. O.L.C., 2012 WL 168645 (2012).
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decision to reject the pro forma recess appointments on formalist
grounds, emphasizing that the Constitution’s text grants broad
discretion to the Senate to control its own operations and that the
recess-appointments procedure is expressly limited to the recess
37
context.
Both decisions share another trait: reluctance to engage with
current governmental realities. In terms Professor Richard Pildes has
recently used, these decisions represent instances of “institutional
formalism,” in that they approach the governmental institutions
involved “at a high level of abstraction and generality,” without
reference to “more contingent, specific features of institutional
behavior, or to the particular persons who happen to occupy the
relevant offices, or to the ways in which the institution actually
38
functions in particular eras.” This characteristic is particularly
evident in Free Enterprise Fund, in which the majority zeroed in on
removal over other control mechanisms and paid little heed to
determining whether removal in practice served the pivotal role that
39
the majority ascribed to it. The majority did underscore the way
agency insulation from the President could enhance congressional
power, a somewhat realist perspective on independent agencies. But
it never examined whether enhancing congressional power was a
realistic outcome with respect to the PCAOB, given the SEC’s broad
40
authority over the PCAOB’s operations.
Noel Canning, by contrast, appears much more attuned to the
details of governmental functioning, with lengthy discussion of actual
recess-appointments practice and nuanced assessments of
41
institutional interactions. Indeed, the majority itself proclaimed that
it was “look[ing] to the actual practice of Government to inform [its]
42
interpretation” of the Recess Appointments Clause. But most of this
contextual sensitivity has a distinctive historical flavor. Current

37. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2574–75. The majority added a functionalist aspect by
requiring that the Senate be available to conduct Senate business, but made clear that this
element is to be determined in a formalist fashion by examining the terms of Senate rules. Id.
38. Richard H. Pildes, Institutional Formalism and Realism in Constitutional and Public
Law, 2014 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 2.
39. Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 494–502.
40. Id. at 499–500.
41. See, e.g., Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2570–73 (discussing past practice and institutional
interactions with respect to recess appointments for preexisting vacancies); id. at 2569 (noting
that “[a]cting officers may have less authority than Presidential appointments.”).
42. Id. at 2578.
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political realities only enter in the discussion of the status of pro
forma sessions, and there the discussion has a remarkably anodyne
43
quality. From reading the opinion, it would be difficult to get a sense
of the growing polarization and collapse in institutional norms that
underlay the Senate Democrats’ first use of the pro forma session to
forestall recess appointments in 2007 and the Republicans’ decision to
44
adopt the strategy in 2011. The closest the majority came to
acknowledging that backdrop was its dismissal of the Solicitor
General’s concerns with disruption to the constitutional separationof-powers balance by noting that “the Recess Appointments Clause is
45
not designed to overcome serious institutional friction.”
One particular manifestation of this reluctance to engage with
governmental realities is both decisions’ lack of attention to highlevel positions below the top of the agency. Many such officials enjoy
senior executive service (SES) or general civil-service protections
against termination except for cause, and thus would seem (as Justice
Breyer argued in dissent) to present the same double for-cause
problem. Moreover, evidence exists that the agency staff level—
noncareer SES or what are known as Schedule C appointees—is
46
where loyalty is injected into agencies. But Free Enterprise Fund
simply carved such high-level agency officials out of its constitutional
analysis, noting that “none of the positions [the dissent] identifies are
similarly situated to the [PCAOB]” and “[n]othing in our opinion . . .
should be read to cast doubt on the use of what is colloquially known
47
as the civil service system.” Noel Canning similarly ignored the
presence of lower-ranked agency staff in its consideration of the
scope of the recess-appointments power, including only a passing

43. Id. at 2575–77.
44. On this backdrop, see generally Harvard Law Review Ass’n, Developments in the
Law—Presidential Authority: V. Executive Appointments, 125 HARV. L. REV. 2135, 2144–53
(2012) (tracing the significant conflicts of the last several decades over the power of the
American presidency, including the appointments power and the use of pro forma sessions). A
similar political backdrop underlay the NLRB’s loss of a quorum in 2008 and again went
unmentioned by the Roberts Court in its decision striking down the NLRB’s effort to keep
operating by delegating power to two members. See New Process Steel, L.P. v. Nat’l Labor
Relations Bd., 560 U.S. 674, 676–78 (2010).
45. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2577.
46. See David E. Lewis & Richard W. Waterman, The Invisible Presidential Appointments:
An Examination of Appointments to the Department of Labor, 2001-11, 43 PRES. STUD. Q. 35, 51
(2013).
47. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 507 (2010).
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48

reference to the lesser status of acting heads. Yet the presence of
agency personnel, including high-level officers whose tenure is
unaffected by a vacancy at the top, seems quite relevant to assessing
the extent to which allowing recess appointments during intrasession
breaks or for preexisting vacancies is necessary to realize the
constitutional goal of “preserv[ing] ‘the vigour of government’ at
49
times when . . . [the Senate] is in recess.”
To be fair, in ignoring agency personnel below the agency-head
level, Free Enterprise Fund and Noel Canning were simply following a
long line of Supreme Court precedent. Other than appointments
cases that address whether a particular officer is an inferior or
principal officer, the separation-of-powers jurisprudence pays little
50
attention to agencies’ internal structure and staffing. By contrast,
internal agency design and developments such as politicization of
agency personnel are an increasing focus of political debate and
51
scholarship. In particular, delays in filling high-level agency posts
that require Senate confirmation are identified as undermining
52
agencies’ ability to function even when agency heads are in place.
Moreover, scholars have documented not only a “staggering”
increase in the number of agency positions requiring Senate
confirmation, mostly “occurring at secondary and tertiary levels and

48. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2569.
49. Id. at 2577 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 1, at 5 (Alexander Hamilton)); see also id. at
2609–10 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
50. See Gillian E. Metzger, The Constitutional Duty To Supervise, 124 YALE L.J. 1836,
1859–63 (2015).
51. For scholarly interest, see, for example, DAVID E. LEWIS, THE POLITICS OF
PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS: POLITICAL CONTROL AND BUREAUCRATIC PERFORMANCE 1,
13–19 (2008) (detailing political appointments, particularly outside the cabinet or agency-head
level); Jacob Gersen, Designing Agencies, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND
PUBLIC LAW 333 (Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell eds., 2010). For political
interest, see Exec. Order No. 13,422, 72 Fed. Reg. 2763, 2764 (Jan. 18, 2007) (adding a
requirement that approval by agency regulatory-policy officers ordinarily be required for
rulemaking to commence and that such officers be presidential appointees chosen in
consultation with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)); Jonathan Weisman, Liberal
Treasury Nominee’s Wall St. Prowess May Be a Vulnerability, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/28/business/economy/liberal-treasury-nominees-deal-makingprowess-could-be-a-liability-.html (noting Senator Elizabeth Warren’s efforts to prevent the
confirmation of the undersecretary for domestic finance).
52. Anne Joseph O’Connell, Vacant Offices: Delays in Staffing Top Agency Positions, 82 S.
CAL. L. REV. 913, 922, 935–46 (2009).
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below,” but also an increase in political opposition to such
53
subcabinet-level nominees.
B. Against Institutional Innovation
The strongest similarity between Free Enterprise Fund and Noel
Canning, however, lies in their shared resistance to innovation in
government. Both majority decisions treat such novelty as
constitutionally suspect. In Free Enterprise Fund, the majority
repeatedly characterized the PCAOB as presenting a “novel
54
structure” and “a new situation not yet encountered by the Court.”
The Court openly expressed its constitutional skepticism about
innovation, agreeing with the dissenting judge below that “the most
telling indication of [a] severe constitutional problem . . . is the lack of
55
historical precedent” for Congress’s action. And the majority’s
excision of established governance structures from the scope of its
holding is yet another signal of its institutional conservatism, in the
Burkean sense of resistance to change and support for the status
56
quo. Strikingly, even Justice Breyer’s dissent appeared to resist
institutional innovation. Instead of defending the PCAOB on the
ground that novel structures were needed to respond to failures in
accounting oversight, he argued that the double for-cause structure of
the PCAOB was not new at all and contended that the decision called
into question the constitutionality of “hundreds, perhaps thousands,”
57
of high-level positions.
In Noel Canning, novelty was doubly present: first, with respect
to the D.C. Circuit’s holding that the recess-appointments power was
only available for vacancies that arose during intersession recesses;

53. See Joel D. Aberbach & Bert A. Rockman, The Appointments Process and the
Administrative Presidency, 39 PRES. STUD. Q. 38, 41, 48–49 (2009); see infra notes 88–94 and
accompanying text. See generally PAUL C. LIGHT, THICKENING GOVERNMENT: FEDERAL
HIERARCHY AND THE DIFFUSION OF RESPONSIBILITY (1995) (describing the creeping
accretion of bureaucrats in the federal administration, which decreases the efficacy of
administrative institutions through a diffusion of responsibility).
54. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 483, 496 (2010);
see also id. at 501 (“[W]e deal with the unusual situation, never before addressed by the Court,
of two layers of for-cause tenure.”); id. at 514 (“[T]he Act before us imposes a new type of
restriction.”).
55. Id. at 505 (quoting Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d
667, 699 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting), aff’d in part and reversed in part, 561 U.S.
477).
56. See supra notes 34, 47 and accompanying text; see also supra note 8.
57. Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 540–41 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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and second, in President Obama’s use of the recess-appointments
power when the Senate was formally in session. The majority
repeatedly emphasized this first manifestation, assigning longstanding
historical practice substantial weight in separation-of-powers
58
analysis. By contrast, the majority made no mention of the fact that
the President had used the recess-appointments power as it had never
59
been used before. The majority’s silence on this point is somewhat
surprising, given its holding that this use of the power was
unconstitutional and its reliance elsewhere on historical practice. One
reason may be that emphasizing the novelty of Obama’s actions
flagged the equally novel character of pro forma sessions, a feature of
the case the majority sidestepped by focusing on the broad textual
grants to the two houses of Congress to control their own internal
60
operations.
This Burkean stance has surfaced elsewhere in the Roberts
Court’s jurisprudence, most prominently in National Federation of
61
Independent Business v. Sebelius (NFIB), in which the Court
addressed the constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act’s (ACA’s)
62
individual mandate. In the course of holding that the individual
mandate fell outside of the commerce power, Chief Justice Roberts
portrayed it as unprecedented, arguing that “Congress ha[d] never
attempted to . . . compel individuals not engaged in commerce to
63
purchase an unwanted product.” According to the Chief Justice,
such “new conceptions of federal power” at least created good reason
for careful consideration of their implications: “Legislative novelty is
not necessarily fatal; there is a first time for everything. But
sometimes ‘the most telling indication of [a] severe constitutional
problem . . . is the lack of historical precedent’ for Congress’s
64
action.”
58. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2559–60, 2564, 2573, 2577
(2014).
59. Id. at 2573–77.
60. Another factor may be that the Noel Canning majority was composed largely of
Justices who had resisted attacks on innovation in decisions such as National Federation of
Independent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2625 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
61. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
62. Id. at 2577.
63. Id. at 2586.
64. Id. (quoting Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 505
(2010)); see also id. at 2599 (distinguishing the “novel course of directing individuals to purchase
insurance” under the commerce power from “Congress’s use of the Taxing Clause to encourage
buying something,” which was “not new”).
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Such resistance to innovation is not a dominant trait of the
65
Roberts Court’s constitutional jurisprudence writ large. In its first
years, the Roberts Court seemed inclined in a more minimalist
direction, opting for narrow constitutional decisions that severed a
constitutionally troublesome application or read a statutory provision
66
in such a way as to avoid invalidation. But the Court soon
demonstrated it was quite willing to act more dramatically. Its narrow
as-applied limitation of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002
67
(BCRA) in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life became a broadscale
rejection of the BCRA’s constitutionality and the constitutionality of
longstanding bans on direct corporate campaign contributions in
68
Citizens United v. FEC. Similarly, the Court’s limited expansion of
the Voting Rights Act’s (VRA’s) bailout provision in Northwest
69
Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v. Holder evolved in
70
Shelby County v. Holder into an invalidation of the VRA’s coverage
formula, which in practice undid the law’s core preclearance process.
Notwithstanding the Court’s efforts to defend the decisions in
Citizens United and Shelby County as in keeping with original
71
understandings, it is hard to view decisions striking down
longstanding regulatory arrangements as Burkean or anti-innovation.
Similarly, the Roberts Court’s willingness to overturn longstanding
constitutional precedent fits poorly with an account of its

65. For the somewhat contrasting view that “[t]he Roberts Court has regularly relied on
traditionalism in constitutional cases,” see Louis Virelli, Jr., Constitutional Traditionalism and
the Roberts Court, 73 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 39–61 (2011).
66. See generally Gillian E. Metzger, Facial and As-Applied Challenges Under the Roberts
Court, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 773 (2009) (analyzing the Roberts Court’s conservative
preference for as-applied challenges over facial challenges); see also Sunstein, supra note 8, at
444–45 (noting that “on prominent occasions, [Roberts] seems to write as a self-conscious
Burkean”).
67. FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007).
68. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 347–56 (2010) (overturning
federal prohibition on corporate campaign contributions); see also id. at 394–95 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (noting that national restrictions on corporate political contributions date back to
1907).
69. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193 (2009).
70. See, e.g., Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2625–29 (2013) (holding Section 4 of
the 1965 VRA unconstitutional); Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 204 (noting, in dicta, that “[t]he Act’s
preclearance requirements and its coverage formula raise serious constitutional questions”); see
also Richard L. Hasen, Shelby County and the Illusion of Minimalism, 22 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 713, 714 (2014).
71. See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2623–25; Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 353–54; id. at 386–
93 (Scalia, J. concurring).
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jurisprudence as legalistic or dominated by a commitment to the rule
72
of law.
How then to explain the anti-innovation theme of NFIB, Free
Enterprise Fund, and Noel Canning? Notably, all three decisions
address matters of constitutional structure more than individual
rights, suggesting that the Roberts Court may be particularly
reluctant to countenance innovation in the federal government’s
institutional arrangements or assertions of authority. This explanation
is not fully satisfying, given that Shelby County similarly addressed
questions of structure and authority, specifically the federal
government’s power to subject state governments to preclearance of
any changes to their voting arrangements. Yet a striking feature of
Shelby County is the majority’s insistent characterization of the VRA
as the truly radical innovation—an “extraordinary” and “drastic
departure from basic principles of federalism” made necessary by
73
“exceptional conditions.” On this view, Shelby Country falls into line
with the other three structural cases, as an instance when the Court
resisted the political branches’ willingness to reenact innovative
structures and assertions of power. Moreover, the Court has invoked
novelty as grounds for constitutional suspicion of governance
measures in the past, particularly with respect to measures that affect
74
federal–state relationships.
Yet another cause of the Court’s resistance to innovation is its
constitutional interpretive methodology. That constitutional
innovation fits poorly with originalism is hardly a surprise given
originalism’s rejection of the idea that constitutional meaning evolves
75
over time. More surprising perhaps is that a similar resistance to
innovation results from an approach that does accept evolving
meaning and accords constitutional significance to political practices
that have emerged over time. This was the approach of the Noel
Canning majority, which self-consciously assigned pride of place to
“‘long settled and established practice’” in separation-of-powers

72. For a condemnation of the Roberts Court as failing to adhere to rule-of-law values, see
generally Eric J. Segall, Is the Roberts Court Really a Court?, 40 STETSON L. REV. 701 (2011).
73. Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2618; see Hasen, supra note 70, at 726–28.
74. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 743–45 (1999); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S.
898, 905–17, 925 (1997).
75. See Randy Barnett, The Gravitational Force of Originalism, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 411,
412–18 (2013) (describing originalism’s theoretical commitments and identifying its central
normative claim as being that “the original meaning of the text provides the law that legal
decisionmakers are bound by or ought to follow”).
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analysis as against the dissent’s originalist analysis. The prime
justifications for an emphasis on historical practice are that it respects
the separation-of-powers understandings and agreements of political
77
branches. Ironically, however, one unintended cost of such an
approach may be a diminution of the political branches’ ability to
craft new understandings, given that by definition such emergent
views would lack the lengthy provenance identified as critical to
78
constitutional legitimacy.
II. APPOINTMENTS IN THE POLITICAL BRANCHES
Turning from the courts to politics, a very different image of
appointments emerges. Filling vacancies, rather than removing sitting
officeholders, is the central challenge. Moreover, the defining
characteristic of the current appointment process, and of
congressional–executive interactions more broadly, is novelty.
Established mechanisms for policysetting and compromise are being
cast aside, the casualties of increasing polarization in Congress
combined with divided government and presidential political
imperatives. New norms and governing approaches are emerging,
with a heavy emphasis on executive action. Although prior practices
may return with a switch to unified government, good reason exists to
expect innovation even then.
76. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2559–60 (2014) (quoting
The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 689 (1929)). Perhaps the most famous articulation of this
mode of analysis is Justice Frankfurter’s statement that “a systematic, unbroken, executive
practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned, engaged
in by Presidents who have also sworn to uphold the Constitution, making as it were such
exercise of power part of the structure of our government, may be treated as a gloss on
‘executive Power’ vested in the President.” Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579, 610–11 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). For a detailed and sophisticated assessment of
historical practice in separation-of-powers analysis, see generally Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor
W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411 (2012).
77. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2559–60 (identifying such practices as “liquidat[ion]” of the
meaning of separation of powers by the political branches that deserve deference in part
because of the branches’ representative legitimacy) (quoting James Madison, Letter to Spencer
Roane (Sept. 2, 1819), in 8 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 450 (G. Hunt ed. 1908));
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 610 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“Deeply embedded traditional ways
of conducting government cannot supplant the Constitution or legislation, but they give
meaning to the words of a text or supply them.”); see also Bradley & Morrison, supra note 76, at
343–47 (describing justifications based on acquiescence, waiver, and institutional competency).
78. Alternative justifications offered in defense of this approach are that it represents a
Burkean respect for the status quo and legitimizes constitutional analysis by tying it to
operational reality, see Bradley & Morrison, supra note 76, at 356–61, but these goals may be in
some tension if operational reality is in a process of change.
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A. Contemporary Politics and the Separation of Powers
1. Appointments. Perhaps the most notable feature of the
appointments process today is the difficulty involved in filling top
positions. As Professor Anne Joseph O’Connell notes in a leading
study, “The length of federal agency vacancies is staggering,” with
“Senate-confirmed position[s] . . . empty (or filled by acting officials),
on average, one quarter of the time over th[e] administrations” of
79
President Jimmy Carter through President George W. Bush. These
vacancies represent a combination of delays in initially filling
positions to delays in filling offices once initial appointees leave. The
relatively short tenure of appointees, estimated at one to two years,
80
exacerbates the frequency of unfilled vacancies. Other contributing
causes are complicated White House and Senate processes for
nomination and confirmation, statutory qualifications for offices that
limit the pool of qualified candidates, and statutory confirmation
requirements for appointments that the Constitution would treat as
81
inferior officers. The effect, particularly when combined with
limitations on appointment of acting heads during vacancies, is to
undermine agencies’ ability to function and take action on major
82
issues. Given that Presidents are often judged on their ability to
govern effectively, delays in appointment may well be a more burning
issue for presidential control of the administrative state than
83
restrictions on removal.
79. See O’Connell, supra note 52, at 922, 950–59.
80. Id. at 919 & n.23 (noting a Government Accountability Office report finding a median
appointee tenure of 2.1 years from 1981–1991, and a RAND study reporting an eleven to twenty
month tenure for high-level defense officials from 1947-1999, along with other similar
estimates); see also Matthew Dull, Patrick S. Roberts, Michael Keeney & Sang Ok Choi,
Appointee Confirmation and Tenure: The Succession of U.S. Federal Agency Appointees, 1989–
2009, 72 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 902, 904–05 (Nov.–Dec. 2012) (providing a slightly longer average
of 2.8 years, with 3.3 years on average for agency heads).
81. See O’Connell, supra note 52, at 927–32, 965–74; see also infra note 92 and
accompanying text.
82. See O’Connell, supra note 52, at 936–52 (assessing costs and benefits to agency
functioning from vacancies).
83. See id. at 921 (“Participants in debates over the unitary theory of the executive might
want to spend less time assessing the legitimacy of restrictions on the president’s removal power
and instead pay more attention to analyzing the absence of presidential appointments at the
front end of the process.”); see also LEWIS, supra note 51, at 55 (noting the abysmal federal
response to Hurricane Katrina, specifically the role of political appointees, and arguing that
“[s]ince voters and history judge presidents for the performance of the entire federal
government during their tenure, this creates incentives for presidents to ensure that policy
outcomes, both legislative and administrative, are under their control”); Jerry L. Mashaw,
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Delays in staffing agencies are not a new phenomenon, but
several recent developments have made the problem worse. One is
the expansion in senators’ use of holds on nominees. Holds are an
informal Senate custom under which senators—in a group or
individually—can “stop . . . floor consideration of legislation or
nominations simply by making requests of their party leaders not to
84
take up such matters.” Senators can place any number of temporary
85
or indefinite holds, and until recently could do so largely in secret.
Even senators of the President’s own party have wielded this power
against nominees, as Senator Claire McCaskill’s hold on President
86
Obama’s nomination for the U.S. Space Command demonstrates. A
hold signals the senator’s intention to object to consideration of the
matter, and Senate leaders know that measures such as a filibuster or
other tactics may result if floor consideration nonetheless goes
87
forward. Although holds have a long pedigree, their regular use for
executive-branch nominees is a more recent phenomenon. In
88
previous eras, the Senate deferred more to the President’s choices.
Another new trend is the practice of “holding nominations hostage in
order to extract concessions on other matters from the
administration,” even while acknowledging the nominee’s

Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81, 95
(1985) (asserting that Presidents, unlike legislators, are judged based on the effect of general
government policies); Terry M. Moe, The Politicized Presidency, in THE NEW DIRECTION IN
AMERICAN POLITICS 235, 239 (John E. Chubb & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1985) (explaining that
Presidents are motivated by “political support and opposition, political strategy, and political
tradeoffs,” and therefore value “‘responsive competence,’ not neutral competence”).
84. WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES AND THE POLICY PROCESS 256
(9th ed. 2014); BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING 60–62 (4th ed. 2012)
(providing examples of hold letters).
85. See OLESZEK, supra note 84, at 256–60. The Senate passed a measure in 2011 to
eliminate secret holds and require holds to be made public within two days, but its success in
curbing secret holds remains to be seen, and prior reforms have not had much effect. See id.; see
also Alexandra Arney, The Secret Holds Elimination Act, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 271, 273–75,
278–85 (2011) (describing past practice and reforms).
86. See Craig Whitlock, Senator Continues To Block Promotion of Air Force General,
WASH. POST, June 6, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/senatorcontinues-to-block-promotion-of-air-force-general/2013/06/06/bbf9ea0a-cee3-11e2-ac03178510c9cc0a_story.html.
87. See OLESZEK, supra note 84, at 257.
88. GERHARDT, supra note 4, at 164–68; see also THOMAS MANN & NORMAN ORNSTEIN,
IT’S EVEN WORSE THAN IT LOOKS 91–98 (1st ed. 2012) (providing data on Senate delays on
executive-branch appointments); WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31685,
PROPOSALS TO REFORM “HOLDS” IN THE SENATE 1–2 (2011) (noting that holds first became
widespread in 1970s).
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89

qualifications. A recent example is the Senate hold-up of U.S.
90
ambassador confirmations to protest general filibuster reform. Nor
are holds the only devices senators now use to prevent appointments
from going forward; the pro forma sessions at issue in Noel Canning
are another technique, as is refusing to attend committee hearings on
91
nominees to deprive the committee of a necessary quorum.
These practices combine to create even longer confirmation
delays, with high-level officials below the cabinet-secretary level
92
suffering the most. Such delays led the Democratically controlled
Senate to adopt a change to the filibuster in 2013, preventing its use
on executive-branch and judicial nominees other than to the Supreme
93
Court. Nonetheless, the appointments process continues to move
94
slowly. Moreover, these delays and the increasingly contentious and
burdensome appointments process have taken on a life of their own,
serving to dissuade top candidates from agreeing or seeking to be
95
nominated in the first place.
Expanded use of indefinite and secret holds on executive officials
also signals a collapse of established norms governing the
appointments process. Professor Michael Gerhardt has argued that
given the thinness of constitutional requirements on appointments,
“the driving force of the appointments process are the norms
developed by Presidents and senators to constrain or guide their
96
decision making.” Perhaps the most well known of these

89. SINCLAIR, supra note 84, at 64; see also MANN & ORNSTEIN, supra note 88, at 98–100.
90. Anne Gearan & Ed O’Keefe, Senate Turf Fight Hurts Approval of Obama’s Diplomatic
Nominees, WASH. POST, Mar. 6, 2014, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
national-security/senate-turf-fight-hurts-approval-of-obamas-diplomatic-nominees/2014/03/06/
f9640e72-a320-11e3-b865-38b254d92063_story.html.
91. See Matthew C. Stephenson, Can the President Appoint Principal Executive Officers
Without a Senate Confirmation Vote?, 122 YALE L.J. 940, 943–45 & n.6 (2013); THOMAS E.
MANN & NORMAN ORNSTEIN, THE BROKEN BRANCH 162–69 (2009) (describing presidential
deviation from judicial-appointment norms).
92. See MANN & ORNSTEIN, supra note 88, at 95; Juliet Eilperin, Chances for Obama
Nominees to be Confirmed are Falling, Even with Over Two Years to Go, WASH. POST, Mar. 26,
2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/chances-for-obama-nominees-to-be-confirmedare-falling-even-with-over-two-years-to-go/2014/03/26/73a87b84-b107-11e3-9627-c65021d6d572
_story.html; see also Weisman, supra note 51 (documenting the Senate’s rejection of Obama’s
nominees to fill administration positions).
93. See Peters, supra note 7.
94. See Eilperin, supra note 92.
95. See id.; Norman Ornstein, Slow Confirmation Process is Hurting U.S. Government,
ROLL CALL, June 24, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 12062010.
96. GERHARDT, supra note 88, at 3.
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appointments norms is senatorial courtesy, or the norm that a
President will defer to the views of senators from his or her party in a
state when deciding whom to nominate for federal offices for that
97
state. Other longstanding norms are senatorial deference to
presidential nominations to subcabinet offices and presidential
notification before making recess appointments. Although these
norms have proved resilient over the years, recent experience signals
that many are eroding and are no longer reliable controls on the
98
process.
2. Broader Separation-of-Powers Trends: Defaults, Shutdowns,
and Executive Unilateralism. These appointments norms are part of a
much wider network of constitutional conventions, or “emergent,
99
quasi-legal norms that organize the workings of government.” Even
outside of the appointments context, many of the norms and
conventions governing interbranch relationships—separation-of100
powers conventions, in Professor David Pozen’s terminology —have
eroded significantly in recent years.
One prominent instance is the debt-ceiling crisis of 2011. Despite
prior battles over raising the debt ceiling, “the mid-2011 political
crisis was the first time that it appeared that Congress might just
refuse to increase the debt ceiling” to cover the costs of spending it
101
had already authorized. Instead, the expectation had always been
that Congress would respond to the imperative of honoring national
debts and protecting the financial markets against the harm of a U.S.

97. Id. at 143–45; Tonja Jacobi & Jeff VanDam, The Filibuster and Reconciliation: The
Future of Majoritarian Lawmaking in the U.S. Senate, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 261, 284–85
(2013).
98. See MANN & ORNSTEIN, supra note 88, at 91–100 (identifying greater resistance to
executive-branch appointees); GERHARDT, supra note 88, at 145–53, 166–79 (describing failed
presidential efforts to move away from senatorial courtesy); see also David E. Pozen, Self-Help
and the Separation of Powers, 124 YALE L.J. 2, 40–41 (2014) (observing that the norm against
impeachment for nonfelony offenses is resilient).
99. Pozen, supra note 98, at 27. In David Pozen’s words, “[c]onstitutional conventions are
often analogized to the rules of the game. They are rules that distribute responsibilities and
facilitate cooperation among ‘the major organs and officers of government.’” Id. at 30 (quoting
GEOFFREY MARSHALL, CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS 1 (1984)); see also Adrian Vermeule,
Conventions of Agency Independence, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1163, 1181–94 (2013) (describing
constitutional conventions).
100. Pozen, supra note 98, at 27.
101. Neil H. Buchanan & Michael C. Dorf, How to Choose the Least Unconstitutional
Option: Lessons for the President (and Others) from the Debt Ceiling Standoff, 112 COLUM. L.
REV. 1175, 1186–88 (2012); see also MANN & ORNSTEIN, supra note 88, at 5–8.
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default. In fact, Congress did so again in 2011, but with strong
statements of continued resistance from congressional leaders and not
102
until the country’s credit rating had been downgraded. The 2011
battles over spending were then replicated in 2013, resulting in a
sixteen-day government shutdown before a budget deal was
103
reached. Other examples of interbranch contestation and deviation
from longstanding conventions are the significant increase in use or
threatened use of the filibuster on legislation, dramatically expanded
congressional investigations, and assertive congressional exercise of
104
Moreover, even when
its contempt and subpoena powers.
legislation gets enacted, it increasingly takes an “unorthodox” route,
with Congress using reconciliation bills and other measures to avoid
105
the filibuster threat.
The President, too, has begun to set domestic policy in new ways.
A major example is the Obama administration’s expanded use of
waiver. In several critical policy contexts—such as healthcare,
education, and welfare—the administration has waived key parts of
governing statutes, for example waiving the adequate yearly progress
106
requirements of the No Child Left Behind Act. Although waivers
are statutorily authorized and have been used previously, their
employment to dramatically alter a statutory regime is a new
107
development.
The Obama administration has also used its
immigration-enforcement discretion to create affirmative programs
108
granting relief from deportation for millions of aliens. Moreover,
102. See Buchanan & Dorf, supra note 101, at 1178–79; Budget Control Act of 2011, Pub. L.
No. 112-25, § 401, 125 Stat. 240, 259–63 (2011) (establishing Joint Select Committee on Deficit
Reduction to recommend legislation that would reduce deficit by $1.5 trillion by 2021).
103. See Jonathan Weisman & Ashley Parker, Republicans Back Down, Ending Crisis Over
Shutdown and Debt Limit, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2013, at A1.
104. See SINCLAIR, supra note 84, at 5, 80–84; John Bresnahan & Seung Min Kim, Attorney
General Eric Holder Held in Contempt of Congress, POLITICO, June 26, 2012, http://www.
politico.com/news/stories/0612/77988.html (noting the House vote “to hold Attorney General
Eric Holder in contempt of Congress over his failure to turn over documents related to the Fast
and Furious scandal, the first time Congress has taken such a dramatic move against a sitting
Cabinet official”); Ezra Klein, Let’s Talk: The Move to Reform the Filibuster, NEW YORKER,
Jan. 28, 2013, at 24 (“From 1917 to 1970, the majority sought cloture fifty-eight times. Since the
start of President Obama’s first term, it has sought cloture more than two hundred and fifty
times.”).
105. See SINCLAIR, supra note 84, at 101–06; Jacobi & VanDam, supra note 97, at 299–315.
106. See David J. Barron & Todd D. Rakoff, In Defense of Big Waiver, 113 COLUM. L. REV.
265, 279–81 (2013).
107. See id. at 267–68; Pozen, supra note 98, at 5.
108. See Jeh C. Johnson, Memorandum on Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect
to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children and with Respect to Certain
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many of these measures came in response to congressional failure to
enact legislation sought by the President, giving them even more of an
109
interbranch aspect. Interestingly, the threatened debt default also
led to calls for the President to act unilaterally by ignoring the debt
ceiling, raising it under the authority of Section 4 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, or achieving the same result by minting two one-trillion110
dollar platinum coins. Here, however, the Obama administration
did not pursue executive action to fill a congressional void, insisting
111
that only Congress had authority to raise the debt limit.
These moves have a punch–counterpunch quality. Actions by
Congress and the President trigger responses that in turn trigger
further reprisals. The recess-appointments saga is a prime example.
There, Democrats initially instituted pro forma sessions as retaliation
against what they perceived as President Bush’s failure to adequately
consult on judicial appointments. Republicans during the Obama
administration adopted the same technique to prevent appointments
they opposed on policy grounds. President Obama then responded by
asserting the right to make recess appointments during a pro forma
session, the action Noel Canning rejected. These contests are
alternatively referred to as constitutional showdowns, constitutional
112
hardball, or constitutional institutional self-help. But however

Individuals Whose Parents are U.S. Citizens or Permanent Residents 3 (Nov. 20, 2014),
available at http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_deferred_action
.pdf; Jeh C. Johnson, Memorandum on Enforcement Priorities and Prosecutorial Discretion 3–6
(Nov. 20, 2014), available at http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_
prosecutorial_discretion.pdf.
109. Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Dream On: The Obama Administration’s
Nonenforcement of Immigration Laws, the DREAM Act, and the Take Care Clause, 91 TEX. L.
REV. 781, 787–92 (2013) (describing Obama’s actions as a response to the failure of the
DREAM Act to get adopted); Gillian E. Metzger, To Tax, To Spend, To Regulate, 126 HARV.
L. REV. 83, 114–15 (2012) (noting that the Obama administration included terms in waivers that
it had sought in reform legislation).
110. See Buchanan & Dorf, supra note 101, at 177–81 (gathering suggestions and arguing
that the President should have continued to borrow and ignored the debt ceiling as the least
unconstitutional option).
111. Letter from George W. Madison, Gen. Counsel, Treasury Dep’t, to N.Y. Times (July 8,
2011), available at http://www.treasury.gov/connect/blog/Pages/Fact-Check-Treasury-GeneralCounsel-George-Madison-Responds-to-New-York-Times-Op-Ed-on-14th-Amendment.aspx
(stating that Secretary Geithner had “always viewed the debt limit as a binding legal constraint
that can only be raised by Congress”).
112. See, e.g., Eric Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Constitutional Showdowns, 156 U. PA. L.
REV. 991, 991–93 (2008); Pozen, supra note 98, at 7; Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Hardball, 37
J. MARSHALL L. REV. 523, 523 (2004).
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denominated, their main feature is fluidity and dynamism, as each
branch responds to new moves by the other.
B. Innovation and Political Polarization
The contemporary political reality of appointments, and
congressional–executive relations more generally, is thus
characterized by change and innovation. Many factors contributed to
this situation, ranging from the Senate’s increased individualistic
character, to greater centralized power in House party leaders, to
particular politicians and their agendas, the permanent campaign,
113
money in politics, transformations in media, and so on. But the
single most important cause is growing polarization in national
politics, particularly combined with divided government. Polarization
not only leads to breakdowns in established norms; it also creates
incentives to adopt novel governance strategies. Recognition of the
polarization dynamic thus suggests that institutional innovation is
only likely to grow at the national level.
1. Political Polarization, Divided Government, and Innovation.
Political scientists have documented significantly increased political
polarization in Congress. The ideological gap between the two parties
is growing, with increasingly consistent party divides across a range of
policy issues. Although the Democratic Party has become somewhat
more liberal, the main contributor to this ideological gap is a
114
significant conservative shift in the Republican Party. Polarization is
most acute among political elites, but there is also corresponding
polarization in each party’s electoral base, with Americans
developing more internally consistent ideological and policy views,
115
and electoral units becoming more homogeneously partisan. A wellrecognized reason for this newfound ideological consistency within
parties is the movement of southern Democrats to the Republican
113. For different accounts, see, for example, MANN & ORNSTEIN, supra note 88, at 8–15,
31–80; SINCLAIR, supra note 84, at 134–65; Nolan McCarty, The Policy Effects of Political
Polarization, in THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS: ACTIVIST GOVERNMENT
AND THE RISE OF CONSERVATISM 224–32 (Paul Pierson & Theda Skocpol eds., 2007); Pildes,
supra note 9, at 286–88, 295–96, 319–21.
114. See NOLAN MCCARTY, KEITH T. POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, POLARIZED
AMERICA: THE DANCE OF IDEOLOGY AND UNEQUAL RICHES 3, 23–31 (2006); Gary C.
Jacobson, Partisan Polarization in American Politics: A Background Paper, 43 PRES. STUD. Q.
688, 690–700 (2013); Pildes, supra note 9, at 276–81.
115. Jacobson, supra note 114, at 691–97; Nathaniel Persily, Introduction, in SOLUTIONS TO
POLITICAL POLARIZATION IN AMERICA (Nathaniel Persily ed., 2015) (draft at 4–10).
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116

Party over the twentieth century’s later decades. A less commonly
identified contributor is rising income inequality, with high-income
voters increasingly identifying as Republicans and poorer voters as
117
Democrats.
The effects of political polarization are intensified by divided
government, in which at least one of the houses of Congress is in the
hands of one party and the presidency is in the hands of the other.
Divided government has become our national norm, occurring in two118
thirds of Congresses between 1955 and 2015. Moreover, differences
in the distribution of the two parties’ voters makes divided
government likely in the future. Republican voters are more
efficiently distributed from their party’s perspective, in that they are
spread more evenly across areas, whereas Democratic voters are
concentrated in urban areas. According to political scientist Gary
Jacobson, this distribution makes Republicans likely to continue to
control the House. At the presidential level, Republican voters
represent shrinking demographic categories, whereas Democrats
have attracted growing ones. This suggests Democrats may continue
to win at the presidential level, with ongoing divided government the
119
result.
Debate exists on whether—and to what extent—divided
government alone impacts Congress’s productivity, with recent
scholarship arguing that it substantially lowers enactment of
120
significant legislation. But adding in political polarization makes

116. See MANN & ORNSTEIN, supra note 91, at 44–54; Pildes, supra note 9, at 287–95.
117. MCCARTY ET AL., supra note 114, at 71–109 (advancing income inequality as a major
factor in polarization).
118. See Pildes, supra note 9, at 326; see also A Visual Guide: The Balance Of Power
Between Congress and The Presidency, ABOUT.COM, http://uspolitics.about.com/od/us
government/l/bl_party_division_2.htm (containing data on divided government by Congress
going back to 1945).
119. See Jacobson, supra note 114, at 704–05.
120. See Stephen Ansolabehere, Maxwell Palmer & Benjamin Schneer, Divided
Government and Significant Legislation: A History of Congress from 1789-2010, at 2–6, 17–27
(Apr. 23, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (describing scholarship and concluding that divided
versus unified government does have a substantial impact on production of significant
legislation, but cannot explain broad trends in legislation throughout Congress’s history); see
also Sarah A. Binder, The Dynamics of Legislative Gridlock, 1947-96, 93 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
519, 527 (1999) (concluding that divided government affects the “ability of the political system
to address major policy issues”). But see DAVID R. MAYHEW, DIVIDED WE GOVERN: PARTY
CONTROL, LAWMAKING, AND INVESTIGATIONS, 1946-2002, at xii, at 220–26 (2d ed. 2005)
(finding that divided government did not affect the overall volume of major legislation, but
noting greater conflict and more investigations during the period 1991–2002).
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“periods of divided government especially prone to conflict and
121
stalemate.” As Professor Pildes notes, earlier eras when divided
government did not preclude significant legislation “occurred before
the historical transformation and purification of the political parties”
122
that exists today.
Whether the resultant legislative inaction
represents congressional dysfunction and gridlock, or instead the
appropriate workings of our separation-of-powers system, is also
123
disputed. Either way, however, the likely net effect is increased
pressure on the President to address issues unilaterally and increased
124
presidential willingness to do so in order to achieve desired policy.
A critical point to note is that even if political polarization and
divided government lead to legislative inaction and gridlock, they
nonetheless may spur innovation—although often the innovation they
generate may lead to more inaction and gridlock. In particular,
senators’ growing refusal to defer to the President’s executive
nominations and their increased willingness to use holds to forestall
125
confirmation reflect growing ideological divides. Indeed, political
scientists Nolan McCarty and Rose Razaghian identify political
polarization as a major factor behind increasing delays in Senate
126
confirmation. Polarization also means that the President is more
likely to have to win on a measure with just his or her party’s support,
121. See Jacobson, supra note 114, at 700–02; see also SARAH A. BINDER, STALEMATE:
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF LEGISLATIVE INACTION 95–96 (2003) (concluding that “the
higher the level of partisan polarization, the less likely issues are to be enacted into law” and
that “[d]ivided party control of Congress and the presidency, in contrast, has little effect on an
issue’s fate”).
122. Pildes, supra note 9, at 326.
123. Compare DAVID R. MAYHEW, PARTISAN BALANCE: WHY POLITICAL PARTIES DON’T
KILL THE U.S. CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM 14, 190 (2011) (arguing that Presidents had a success
rate of around 60 percent under both unified and divided government), Josh Chafetz, The
Phenomenology of Gridlock, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2065, 2081–82 (2013) (arguing that
current legislative inaction reflects lack of strong majority support, not dysfunction), and R.
Shep Melnick, The Conventional Misdiagnosis: Why “Gridlock” is not Our Central Problem and
Constitutional Revision is not the Solution, 94 B.U. L. REV. 767, 768–69, 775–81 (2014) (detailing
recent major legislation and arguing that the problem is not gridlock but programmatic
overload), with MANN & ORNSTEIN, supra note 88, at 101–03 (arguing that dysfunction is
created from combining the U.S. constitutional system with parliamentary-style parties and the
parties’ asymmetric polarization), and Michael J. Teter, Gridlock, Legislative Supremacy, and
the Problem of Arbitrary Inaction, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2217, 2218–21 (2013) (detailing
evidence of legislative inaction and arguing Congress is gridlocked because it is unable to make
substantive policy decisions).
124. McCarty, supra note 113, at 246.
125. SINCLAIR, supra note 84, at 63.
126. Nolan McCarty & Rose Razaghian, Advice and Consent: Senate Responses to Executive
Branch Nominations 1885-1996, 43 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1122, 1136 (1999).
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and an opposing party representative has little incentive to
127
cooperate. To the contrary, refusing to compromise serves to win
128
points with the party’s now more ideological faithful. Furthermore,
when lack of cooperation forestalls legislation—whether as a result of
legislative mechanisms such as the filibuster or because of the
impossibility of getting bicameral agreement when the opposition
party controls one house of Congress—the President has turned to
new forms of unilateral action to achieve policy reform. In sum, to a
large extent the recent innovations in how the branches operate and
interact can be traced to political polarization and divided
government.
2. Political Polarization, United Government, and Regulatory
Innovation. Interestingly, political polarization may contribute to
innovation in periods of united government as well. To begin with,
dilatory tactics like the filibuster may become even more important
mechanisms for the minority party to wield, as it cannot rely on
control of one chamber to prevent the enactment of legislation.
Hence, new or more extreme uses of such tactics may emerge. At the
same time, the majority party may itself utilize new legislative
129
methods in order to constrain or avoid minoritarian resistance.
A prime example of these dynamics is the growing use of
reconciliation bills as the means to legislative enactment.
Reconciliation developed as a technique for imposing discipline on
the congressional budgeting process, and involves enactment of an
130
omnibus bill that aligns spending targets with policy proposals. The
key feature of reconciliation is that all debate on a reconciliation bill
or its amendments is limited to twenty hours, thereby precluding a
131
filibuster threat. As a result, the reconciliation process has proved
crucial in passing contentious legislation for which there is majority
support but less than sixty votes in the Senate. Two prominent recent
examples are the Bush income tax cuts in 2001 and the ACA in
132
2009.
But the procedural requirements of reconciliation, in

127. SINCLAIR, supra note 84, at 163; Jacobson, supra note 114, at 700.
128. See, e.g., MANN & ORNSTEIN, supra note 91, at 8–29 (describing stances of key
congressional leaders in the 2011 debt-ceiling crisis).
129. See SINCLAIR, supra note 84, at 164.
130. See Jacobi & VanDam, supra note 97, at 294–95, 297–98 (describing reconciliation
procedures).
131. Id. at 295.
132. Id. at 308–15.
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particular the Byrd Rule, can significantly affect the shape of policy
133
adopted through this route. The Byrd Rule, which can only be
waived by a three-fifths vote, prohibits inclusion of extraneous
134
provisions in a reconciliation bill.
A second reason to expect innovation is that Congress is unlikely
to do much checking of the President in periods of high polarization
and unified government. As Professors Daryl Levinson and Richard
Pildes argue, the checks in our separation-of-powers system result
more from party and political identification than institutional loyalty.
Members of Congress are more likely to check overreaching by a
135
President of the opposite party than a President of their own.
Polarization is only likely to intensify this dynamic, and unified
government means that the President’s party can prevent
congressional investigations into new presidential assertions of
authority. Indeed, some scholars point to the unified government that
existed during most of the first six years of the George W. Bush
presidency as proof of this phenomenon, noting for example that no
congressional committee subpoenaed the White House in that
136
period.
Lastly, innovation seems likely with respect to regulatory
substance. The legislation that gets enacted may represent more
dramatic regulatory changes in periods of united government and
polarization. One reason is because polarization pulls each party
away from the center and makes moderating bipartisan compromises
137
less likely to occur. In addition, the lower possibility of bipartisan
support means that passage turns on getting all party members on
board, thereby increasing the leverage of members pushing for more
radical measures. As McCarty argues, to pass in a polarized
environment “policies must generate overwhelming support within
the majority party . . . . Because it is difficult to replace the votes of
more extreme elements with those of moderates from the other
party, . . . policy outcomes may be more extreme relative to the
138
political center.” The extent of a party’s majority in the Senate
133. See SINCLAIR, supra note 84, at 187, 210–22 (describing the impact of reconciliation on
the ACA); McCarty, supra note 113, at 236.
134. See SINCLAIR, supra note 84, at 126–27.
135. See Daryl A. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119
HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2313–15 (2006).
136. See Pildes, supra note 9, at 327 n.214; MANN & ORNSTEIN, supra note 91, at 151.
137. See Jacobson, supra note 114, at 697–702.
138. McCarty, supra note 113, at 244.
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should affect whether this result actually obtains, however, as more
139
extreme legislation also seems likely to trigger a filibuster.
Here, too, recent legislative experience may offer some support,
but the evidence is much more ambiguous. The last period of unified
government, during President Obama’s first term in office, witnessed
the enactment of two major federal regulatory statutes, the ACA and
140
the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform Act. Included within these
statutes were notably innovative measures—the individual mandate
deemed suspiciously novel in NFIB, novel regulatory structures
involving the states, a new resolution process for too-big-to-fail
banks, and creation of a new consumer financial protection agency
with a unique organizational structure and many levels of political
141
insulation. Significantly, the ACA passed on a straight party-line
142
vote. Only a few Republicans—three in the House and three in the
Senate—broke party ranks to vote for Dodd–Frank, and accounts
detail the extensive efforts by party leaders to keep all Democrats on
143
board. On the other hand, many of the more radical proposals
included in the initial measures—most notably the public option for
health insurance and a tax on big banks and hedge funds—did not
144
make it into the final bills. Moreover, a confluence of separate
factors could explain the successful enactment of these major reform
measures, such as that this period marked the first time that the
145
Democrats were in unified control in fourteen years. And the issues
involved carried particular public salience, given the recent financial
disaster and longstanding calls for healthcare reform. Hence, drawing

139. See BINDER, supra note 121, at 97–98.
140. See Melnick, supra note 123, at 779–80.
141. See Gillian E. Metzger, Federalism Under Obama, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 567, 572–
94 (2011) (describing the ACA, Dodd–Frank, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, and
the Recovery Act); David Zaring, A Lack of Resolution, 60 EMORY L.J. 97, 121–29 (2010)
(describing Dodd–Frank’s new resolution authority).
142. See SINCLAIR, supra note 84, at 218–30 (describing the vote on the ACA).
143. See Mike Ferrullo, Regulatory Reform: House Clears Financial Reform Bill Along Party
Lines, Senate Action Delayed, 95 BNA BANKING REP. 5, 5 (July 6, 2010) (reporting that Dodd–
Frank passed by a vote of 237–192 in the House, with three Republican votes in favor); Mike
Ferrullo et al., Regulatory Reform: Senate Sends Financial Regulatory To White House for
President’s Signature, 95 BNA BANKING REP. 90, 90 (July 20, 2010) (reporting that Dodd–Frank
passed by a vote of 60–39 in the Senate, with votes from three Republican senators (Senators
Scott Brown, Susan Collins, and Olympia Snowe)).
144. See SINCLAIR, supra note 84, at 205–06, 215–16; David M. Herszenhorn, Bank Tax is
Dropped in Overhaul of Industry, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2010, at B1.
145. See BINDER, supra note 121, at 27. But see Ansolabehere, supra note 120, at 25–26
(finding that the previous party in control had no effect on rates of legislation).
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any reliable conclusions about whether polarization and unified
government may yield substantive innovative measures in this fashion
requires a more solid empirical foundation, tracing legislative
146
enactments over multiple periods of unified government.
III. ASSESSING THE JUDICIAL–POLITICAL DIVIDE
In short, examination of appointments in the judicial and
political branches reveals a notable contrast: the political branches
currently embrace innovation in the mechanisms of governance, while
the courts view such innovation as constitutionally suspect. Should
this judicial–political disconnect be a cause of concern? Or is it
actually a signal of the constitutional system’s checks and balances
working effectively?
On the positive view, the courts’ reluctance to sanction
institutional innovation is an important counterweight to the political
branches’ inclinations to pervert the constitutional structure for
partisan gain. Judicial resistance is offered as the constitutional
protection against the dangers of political polarization. Noel Canning
is Exhibit A in support of this account, with the Court there
unanimously rejecting a novel presidential assertion of the recessappointments power that on its face was incompatible with the
Constitution’s text. A similar argument animates other fabled
separation-of-powers decisions, such as Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer and Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha,
in which one political branch failed to curb unconstitutional
147
overreach by another. As Justice Scalia stated in his Noel Canning
dissent, “policing the ‘enduring structure’ of constitutional
government when the political branches fail to do so is ‘one of the
148
most vital functions of this Court.’”
Although not without appeal, this positive account of the current
judicial–political disconnect is simply too sanguine. It ignores the real

146. Generating such data is difficult at the federal level, given the dominance of divided
government. But unified government is much more common at the state level.
147. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 942 n.13, 944 (1983) (emphasizing that neither the
convenience of the legislative veto nor the fact that the President signed legislation containing it
should affect analysis of its compatibility with constitutional separation of powers); Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 583 (1952) (noting that the President informed
Congress of his action in seizing the steel mills and that Congress did not act).
148. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2559, 2593 (2014) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Pub. Citizen v. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 468 (1989) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in the judgment)).
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risk that the courts may intervene asymmetrically and in ways that
amplify rather than dampen the harmful effects of polarization. One
point worth noting at the outset is that many, if not most, of the
innovations in congressional–executive interactions will avoid judicial
review. As the Court noted in Noel Canning, the Constitution
149
“explicitly empowers” each house to “determine the Rules of its
150
Proceedings,” and “‘all matters of method are open to [its]
determination,’” provided the method chosen is rationally related to
151
the goal sought and does not violate constitutional rights.
Executive-branch actions, in turn, may escape review because no one
152
has standing to sue.
In addition, judicial review is likely to be asymmetrical when it
occurs. Judicial review is more probable when action by Congress or
153
the President affects individuals outside of the political branches. It
is also more likely to be available to police legislative or executive
154
action than inaction. Thus, delaying and dilatory tactics in Congress
will avoid scrutiny, but novel measures used to enact policy in the
face of such tactics will not. This privileging of legislative inaction
holds real potential for worsening the gridlock often viewed today as
155
lying at the root of Congress’s dysfunction. Worse, given the
possibility that legislative measures enacted in periods of higher
polarization may be more radical, the judicial resistance to innovation
raises a real risk of judicial invalidation of those measures that do
manage to be enacted. The net result is again a privileging of inaction
and of judicial impediments to majoritarian government. Moreover,
although there have been instances in which legislative inaction has
worked in the direction of greater regulation—the failure to extend

149. Id. at 2574 (majority opinion).
150. Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2),
151. Id. (quoting United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 5 (1892)); see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl.
2; see also Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 230 (1993) (meaning of “try” with respect to
impeachment is a political question and thus left to the Senate to determine).
152. See, e.g., Robert Pear, Suit on Health Law Puts Focus on Funding Powers, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 30, 2014, at A25 (noting a significant standing hurdle to a House effort to sue on ACA
waivers).
153. Cf. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 952 (1983) (identifying as legislative actions those that
“had the purpose and effect of altering the legal rights, duties and relations of persons . . .
outside the legislative branch”).
154. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831–33 (1985).
155. This is, to be sure, a matter of debate. See, e.g., David G. Savage, Justice Scalia:
Americans “Should Learn to Love Gridlock,” L.A. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2011, http://
articles.latimes.com/2011/oct/05/news/la-pn-scalia-testifies-20111005.
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the Bush tax cuts for high-income earners or the failure to enact
legislation overturning Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
greenhouse-gas regulations—judicial resistance to innovation seems
likely to work to the advantage of those opposing major new
regulatory initiatives.
A final reason to be concerned is that major innovations in
governance structures may represent the best available
countermeasures to hyperpolarization in Congress. Reform proposals
run the gamut, but focus in particular on changes to core features of
156
our political system. Examples include mandating open primaries,
getting rid of first-past-the-post election systems, or mandating
157
Many of these measures would mark a
redistricting reform.
dramatic change from longstanding practices. A Supreme Court that
views innovation with suspicion, accepting changes that have emerged
incrementally over time and are supported by historical practice, is
unlikely to be a receptive audience for such reform measures. Hence,
the danger is that rather than serve as a bastion defending the
constitutional separation-of-powers system against newfound partisan
threats, the Court will impede the very innovations needed to make
that system continue to function.
These risks might be unavoidable if the Constitution embodied
the anti-innovation principle that animates the Roberts Court’s
separation-of-powers jurisprudence. But the constitutional basis for
such resistance to structural and governance innovation is quite
dubious. As Justice Ginsburg remarked, dissenting in NFIB, “For
decades, the Court has declined to override legislation because of its
novelty, and for good reason. As our national economy grows and
changes, we have recognized, Congress must adapt to the changing
156. An alternative route is to move the focus away from Congress toward other
policymakers, such as administrative agencies and states or even private actors, accepting that
Congress is unlikely to be the first mover in addressing critical policy issues. See Melnick, supra
note 123, at 782–89; Mark Seidenfeld, The Role of Politics in a Deliberative Model of the
Administrative State, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1397, 1399–1401 (2013). Such a change in focus
would accord with broader regulatory trends—for example, toward privatization and delegation
of increasing programmatic discretion to the states. See Metzger, supra note 141, at 568–71; Jon
D. Michaels, An Enduring, Evolving Separation of Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 515, 517–19
(2015).
157. See, e.g., MANN & ORNSTEIN, supra note 91, at 131–76. But see Nolan McCarty,
Reducing Polarization: Some Facts for Reformers, 2015 U. CHI. LEGAL F. (forthcoming 2015)
(manuscript at 2–4, 26, 32–33), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=2564372 (questioning whether opening primaries will reduce polarization and suggesting
that strengthening party organization, as well as creating more politically homogenous districts,
is better suited to achieving this goal).
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158

economic and financial realities.” The ability to design innovative
governmental structures or regulatory measures is a flexibility the
159
Constitution’s Necessary and Proper Clause gives to Congress.
Professor John Manning argues that this textual assignment to
Congress calls into question the Court’s refusal to defer to
“Congress’s implementation strategies on the basis of abstract
structural inferences about which reasonable people can doubtless
160
differ.” But one can accept judicial reliance on abstract structural
inferences and still conclude that a judicial default rule against novel
congressional measures is at odds with the constitutional allocation of
161
implementation authority to Congress.
Importantly, however, this constitutional defense of innovation
only operates with respect to congressional measures. Executivebranch novelty, such as President Obama’s invocation of the recessappointments power during a pro forma session, cannot be vindicated
on the basis of the Necessary and Proper Clause. This is all the more
true given that the President justified his actions as a response to
Congress’s innovative use of pro forma sessions to prevent recess
appointments. But even executive-branch innovation should not
trigger automatic suspicion. David Pozen contends that such
unilateral executive measures may be an effort to restore the
constitutional separation-of-powers balance rather than undermine it:
“[M]any of the most pointed ways in which Congress and the
President challenge one another can plausibly and profitably be
modeled as self-help . . . efforts to enforce constitutional settlements,”
in particular settlements in the form of established conventions of
“comity and cooperation in governance” that are central to the

158. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2625 (2012) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
159. See Manning, supra note 33, at 6–7.
160. Id. at 48.
161. Some read the Necessary and Proper Clause in a more limited fashion than Manning,
as only supporting grants of incidental powers or institutional structures that comport with
general federalism and separation-of-powers principles. Compare William Baude, Rethinking
the Federal Eminent Domain Power, 122 YALE L.J. 1738, 1749, 1750–55 (2013) (distinguishing
between great and incidental powers and arguing the Necessary and Proper Clause only
incorporates the latter), and Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The “Proper” Scope of
Federal Power: A Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267, 297–
326, 330–33 (1993) (arguing that the Necessary and Proper Clause is limited by traditional
federalism and separation-of-powers principles), with Manning, supra note 33, at 5–7, 54–60.
But even these more limited readings of the Clause do not support a general suspicion of
innovation.
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From this
functioning of our separation-of-powers system.
perspective, President Obama’s recess appointments can be seen as
an effort to respond to the Senate’s deviation from constitutional
conventions governing the appointments process, and to intense
163
congressional obstruction more generally. To be sure, accepting the
self-help description does not make the President’s actions
constitutional, and there are good reasons—particularly in an age of
ever-expanding
unilateral
presidential
power—to
resist
164
countenancing such moves. Whether or not the institutional selfhelp justification is persuasive as a matter of constitutional analysis,
however, it highlights the contemporary political context that is
strikingly absent from the Noel Canning decision.
These criticisms suggest that the Court should adopt a more finegrained approach, one that assesses each measure without a
predisposition against innovation and pays more attention to political
realities. One central feature that deserves greater play in a more
nuanced analysis is whether the innovation represents a unilateral
action by the President or a measure on which the two branches
agree. Although both types of innovation may be constitutional (or
not), the threats they represent to constitutional structure are
significantly different, and the Court’s elision of this distinction is a
sign of its mistaken approach. The Court also would do well to
engage more directly with the polarization and dysfunction that mark
politics today, so that its analysis fully engages with the dynamics at
play in instances of structural and governance innovations. This does
not mean that the Court should sanction otherwise unconstitutional
measures on the grounds that the current political climate renders
such matters practically necessary. Noel Canning demonstrates that
even the more functionalist members of the Court are unwilling to go

162. Pozen, supra note 98, at 8–9; see also Jody Freeman & Davin B. Spence, Old Statutes,
New Problems, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 7 (2014) (“[C]ongressional dysfunction invites agencies
and courts to do the work of updating statutes . . . . [A]gencies are better suited than courts to
do that updating work and . . . because the agency is the legally designated custodian of the
statute (so designated by the enacting Congress), the agency has the superior claim to interpret
the statute’s application to new problems during periods of congressional quiescence.”).
163. Pozen, supra note 98, at 6–7, 39–48.
164. See William P. Marshall, Warning! Self-Help and the Presidency, 124 YALE L.J. F. 95,
95–97 (2014); see also BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC 6 (2010) (“[T]he presidency represents the graver threat: while Schlesinger was
prophetic in sounding the alarm, it has become a far more dangerous institution during the forty
years since he wrote The Imperial Presidency—and these threatening trends promise to
accelerate over the decades ahead.”).

METZGER IN PRINTER FINAL (COMPLETED) (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

THE JUDICIAL–POLITICAL DIVIDE

5/7/2015 6:34 PM

1641

165

so far, and with good reason. But contemporary political challenges
and broader context seem a legitimate factor to take into account in
assessing constitutionally uncertain innovations, just as contemporary
regulatory challenges and economic realities underlie current
166
assessments of the scope of Congress’s commerce power. At a
minimum, the Court should acknowledge the practical effect of its
decisions, and seek to limit disruptive impacts where possible. Thus,
for example, the Court could do more to resuscitate the de facto
officer doctrine, which “confers validity upon acts performed by a
person acting under the color of official title even though it is later
discovered that the legality of that person’s appointment or election
to office is deficient,” so as to limit the disruptive potential of
167
decisions like Noel Canning.
Furthermore, the Court could also signal what constitutional
options may be available to the President or Congress to combat the
other branch’s excesses. Indeed, despite its failure to engage with the
political background behind President Obama’s recess appointments,
the Noel Canning majority provided such a signal, underscoring that
“[t]he Constitution . . . gives the President . . . a way to force a recess”
by adjourning Congress when the two houses disagree “with Respect
168
to the Time of Adjournment.” It also cautioned that for the Senate
to legitimately claim to be in session it needed to be able to conduct
business under its rules and meet quorum requirements, thereby
identifying how the President’s allies could challenge a pro forma
169
session. In short, the Noel Canning Court implicitly recognized the
need to respond to new political realities, but no reason exists to keep

165. For an earlier refusal, see Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 732, 736 (1986) (invalidating
novel budgetary measures adopted to help reduce growing deficits).
166. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 123–29 (1942).
167. See Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 180–84 (1996) (discussing the de facto officer
doctrine and limiting its scope). The issue of the de facto officer doctrine as a means of limiting
the practical impact of overturning the recess appointments was raised at oral argument in Noel
Canning. See Brian J. Leitch, NLRB v. Noel Canning: The Separation-Of-Powers Dialogue
Continues, 2014 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 221, 253–54.
168. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2577 (2014).
169. Id. at 2575–76 (“If any present Senator had raised a question as to the presence of a
quorum, and by roll call it had become clear that a quorum was missing, the Senators in
attendance could have directed the Sergeant at Arms to bring in the missing Senators.”); see
also Tom Goldstein, Can a President (with a Little Help from One Senator of His Party)
Circumvent Most of the Court’s Limitation on the Recess Appointments Power?, SCOTUSBLOG
(June 25, 2014, 8:29 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/06/can-a-president-with-a-little-helpfrom-one-senator-of-his-party-circumvent-most-of-the-courts-limitation-on-the-recessappointments-power.
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this recognition implicit. Indeed, more forthright recognition might
better protect the separation-of-powers system, both by creating
disincentives for the political branches to push the limits of their
powers and by publicly flagging the constitutional threat that political
brinkmanship may pose.
Both of these moves are of particular relevance to current
struggles over appointments. As noted above, despite the focus on
principal officers in Free Enterprise Fund and Noel Canning, the real
battles today center on appointments to inferior officer positions that
require Senate confirmation. Although Congress has the power to
require such Senate approval, the fact that a Senate role is not
constitutionally mandated, and the importance of such appointments
for the executive branch to function, should affect the Court’s
response to political branch innovations affecting inferior officer
appointments. This seems a prime context for expansive invocation of
the de facto officer doctrine to minimize disruption of a finding of
invalidity. Doing so does not sanction a direct constitutional violation
or deny the Senate its constitutionally protected role, which were
170
prime concerns in Noel Canning. Indeed, Free Enterprise Fund
supports taking a limited response to inferior officer appointments
that meet constitutional but not statutory requirements. There, the
Court cured the constitutional violation it identified with the PCAOB
by simply severing Board members’ additional removal protection.
The Court concluded that transforming them into inferior officers
appointed and removed at will by a department head best served
171
Congress’s intent in enacting Sarbanes–Oxley.
In like vein,
acceptance of past decisions by improperly appointed inferior officers
can be justified as the remedial response that best serves
congressional intent underlying the substantive statutes these officers
implement.
More dramatically, perhaps the Court should be more willing to
sustain novel presidential actions installing nominees to these
positions—in either an acting or full capacity—in the face of Senate
refusal to vote on their nominations. Such actions represent an easier
constitutional case than the recess appointments in Noel Canning
because they do not violate constitutional appointment requirements.
Thus, the executive branch’s need for these officers in order to

170. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2558–59, 2574–77.
171. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 508–10 (2010).
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perform its constitutional and statutory responsibilities should enjoy
greater weight in the constitutional analysis.
CONCLUSION
Perhaps it is no surprise that judicial interpretation of an over220-year-old document displays suspicion of innovation in
governance arrangements. But this judicial tendency bodes ill for the
nation’s ability to respond to the highly politically polarized world in
which we live. In such a world, governance innovation is inevitable
and often beneficial. Rather than discourage innovation, the courts
should seek to foster it in the hope that the political branches will
construct measures that allow for a return to more effective
government.

